THE PRESENT POLITICAL SCENARIO IN MYANMAR & ITS STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS TO INDIA

Ahmad Reza Taheri 

Research Fellow at YC - National Center of

International Security & Defense Analysis,

University of Pune

Undoubtedly, India’s foremost foreign policy challenge and priority is its immediate neighborhood. Myanmar, ¹ the subject of this paper, is one of India’s neighbors in which throughout much of the history the two states have not been in normal political relations mainly due to the nature of regime in Myanmar since 1962. The challenges before India as far as the case of Myanmar is concerned are multifold. How to win over the side of junta in Myanmar; How to neutralize the Western stance against Myanmar; and how to balance the rise of China that enjoys far better relations with Myanmar, which its steadily growing military and economic strength in Myanmar threatening India. As far as the political scenario in Myanmar and Indian involvement is concerned, for three decades from 1962 military take over till 1991 because of supporting pro-democratic movements or opposition groups against the military regime in Myanmar, India and Myanmar had minimal contacts with each other. So far as the issue of Western stance against Myanmar such as economic sanctions of EU and US are concerned, India has not been able to play a vital supportive role for Myanmar, as played by China. For managing its relationship with powers such as US, while trying to promote ties with Myanmar, India requires a highly diplomatic skill.  

Well, as the title of this paper suggests, it is divided into two major parts. The first part deals with the present political scenario in Myanmar and its concerns for the powerful regimes such as United States of America and the United Nations. Based on the first part, the second one deals with the strategic implications to India. The paper has focused on the current developments like those of the late 2008 and early 2009 in Myanmar such as human rights violations and insurgency, as well as, concentrates on the implications of such trends to the military regime in Myanmar itself and to India, as the case of this study.     

One of the major recent political scenarios in Myanmar, which has attracted the attention of the world, is the case of Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s pro-democracy Opposition Leader who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. The government of Myanmar has placed her on trial just before the May 27, 2009 deadline to release her from house arrest, which was placed under house arrest for 13 of the last 19 years. As Shankari Sundararaman, a university professor writes, Aung San Suu Kyi represents lasting hope for change from a politically rigid military system, which has kept Myanmar isolated from much of the international community for over 45 years. Under both international and Myanmar’s national law on arbitrary detention, Suu Kyi’s term of house arrest was to end on May 27, after which the junta could not hold her in custody. Just as that deadline was approaching, there was a murky and unexplained intrusion into her residential compound by an uninvited American. The intrusion leaves her more susceptible vis-à-vis her opponents and strongly questions the validity of the allegations brought against her. This development (Suu Kyi’s trial) as is regarded by some critics, is a grim reminder that Myanmar continues on its path of self-destruction and human tragedy with little regard for international opinion and censure. Critics also believe the recent setback indicates that the junta’s promise of holding elections in 2010 remains a remote possibility. For the last 19 years, Myanmar’s protracted political impasse remains a problem both at the domestic level and for the inter-national community at large. This intransigence has been made even more complicated by the demand of the National League for Democracy (NLD) headed by Suu Kyi that the electoral verdict of the 1990 elections is upheld and political power should be handed over to the NLD. The United States of America and the European Union initially supported this claim. However, given the time lapsed since then, and the changed scenario of Myanmar’s interaction with its regional players, there is little feasibility of getting the junta to recognize the 1990 verdict and to act upon it. The US and EU both realize this. Also, in light of the crack down against the monk’s protest in September 2007 and the subsequent unwillingness to accept international assistance in the aftermath of Hurricane Nagis, the imperviousness of the junta becomes very clear. The recent extension of the mandate given to the Tripartite Core Group (TCG) overseeing the rehabilitation is a welcome step, but the political manipulations of the junta do not mitigate its stand on this issue. Moreover, as remarked by Shankari Sundararaman, pushing forward the new constitution and the fraudulent referendum are clear indicators that there is no willingness on the part of the regime to include any form of national reconciliation with the political voices in Myanmar. Given the unchanging reality of the junta, it seems that tackling the problem remains an enigma for both regional and international actors. However, in an attempt to look for a way out, there have been suggestions of following the six party talk formulation, as in the case of North Korea. While this will include both China and Japan, the actual change in approach from these two are not likely to be significant. But, from the point of view of the current impasse, the three remaining key players will have to take cognizance of their approach to Myanmar. These are the US, the ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Cambodia), and India.  For the first time in over two decades, the US is beginning to show willingness to change its approach to Myanmar. US secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s statement during her first foreign visit on a new approach to Myanmar seemed to find resonance in the April 2009 visit of the director of the office of mainland Southeast Asia, Stephen Blake, to Myanmar. Simultaneously, the US deputy secretary of state James Steinberg stated that the US hoped to initiate a new strategy for Myanmar after consultations with other Asian countries, which would act as a roadmap to assist Myanmar out of international isolation. ²   

But, the recent (2009) development in Myanmar on the case of Suu Kyi, for the time being, seemed to have changed the US’s approach towards Myanmar. For example, in the aftermath of Suu Kyi’s recent setback, the US senate has passed an emergency resolution asking for the immediate release of Suu Kyi and other political dissidents. Likewise, earlier in May 2009 UN Security Council repeated the same for the release of all political prisoners in Myanmar including Suu Kyi whose detention dating back to 2003 is arbitrary unjustified and also is in contravention of Myanmar’s own law, as has been asserted by the UN Security Council. ³ The US senate has also urged Obama’s administration to increase its diplomatic efforts among the regional players to bring pressure on Myanmar to uphold the principles of human rights. ⁴ In this regard, the US President Barak Obama on 27 May 2009 strongly criticized Myanmar on the arrest and detention of Suu Kyi, saying, “her continued detention, isolation, and show trial based on spurious charges cast serious doubt on Myanmar’s willingness to be a responsible member of the international community.” He further remarked “this is an important opportunity for the government in Myanmar to demonstrate that it respects its own laws, its own people, and is ready to work with League for Democracy and other ethnic and opposition groups, and is prepared to move towards reconciliation.”  ⁵

Well, for the ASEAN the latest standoff will be a litmus test.  During the 2007 monks’ protest, ASEAN did not bring much pressure on Myanmar because domestic matters did not fall within the purview of its jurisdiction, as opined by a critic, whom believes that, the adoption of the ASEAN Charter should indicate a willingness to take a more effective stand. This is a situation when the ASEAN can balance its "constructive engagement" approach with effective preventive diplomacy. Suspending Myanmar from the ASEAN till the time the junta moves towards a more inclusive national reconciliation process will show that the regional organization is serious in its approach to protect the principles enshrined in the Charter. ⁶

Apart from the case of Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar is also facing with other similar problems of human rights violation, and ethnic insurgency. Although these matters are not new, they continue to threaten the stability of the regime in Myanmar. The weakness of civilian government under U Nu, who held office in 1948-1956, 1957-1958 and 1960-1962, enabled military leaders to gain power. Since the establishment of military regime in 1962, Myanmar has been under the criticism for different issues such as human rights, ethnic insurgency, and other violent incidents. On human rights issue, in January 2009 the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported about a significant degree of sexual violence in Mae La refugee camp on the Thai-Myanmar border, where majority of the refugees are Karen and many others are Christian, Muslim and Buddhist. In the same year, the Karen Human Rights Group NGO reports that the SPDC is subjecting villagers to forced labor and extortion in Toungoo district, and forcing many to flee into hiding. The source claims that such work is actually further militarizes Karen state. The report also includes the construction of army camps, fences, and trenches; however the SPDC claims it is being used to promote peace and development. In another development, the Free Burma Rangers NGO reports that over 200 internally displaced persons fled after attacks by the Myanmar armed forces in northern Karen state in late December 2008 and early January 2009. The soldiers of Myanmar are also reported to have laid landmines between two villages in southern Karenni state in January 2009. ⁷

As long as the regime in Myanmar is not willing to change its stance, the ethnic and armed confrontation continues to exist in the country as a threat to its sovereignty. Myanmar (the ruling State Peace & Development Council, SPDC) frequently fights the insurgent groups such as the Karen National Union/Liberation Army, (KNU-KNLA), the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). Only between January and April of 2009 a record shows that more than 21 cases of armed clashes, insurgency, and population displacement have been taken place in Myanmar.⁸ Majority of these violent activities are politically motivated by different insurgent groups. These political groups do not accept the rule of military in Myanmar and hold their own views and concepts, which may not be acceptable to the regime. For example, in March 2009 the Shan State Army (SSA) said that it does not accept the junta’s political process, and recommended a four-point proposal for ameliorating the political situation in Myanmar; amnesty for all political dissidents and armed opposition, amendment of the proposed constitution, ethnic participation in the electoral commission, and participation of the winners of the 1990 elections in the 2010 elections, and the right to self-rule.  ⁹ Well, it might seem necessary to note that many of the opposition groups or parties while giving their reports against the regime in Myanmar on human rights issues, are to some extent exaggerating. Such groups, for example, claim that forced labor, human trafficking, and child labour are very commonly practiced by the regime in Myanmar, or for that matter, military uses sexual violence as an instrument of control, including systematic rapes and taking of sex slaves as porters for the military, etc. Although these developments more or less are happening in Myanmar, one cannot fully rely on such reports, by completely denying democracy in Myanmar. Democracy, as a theory is an ambiguous concept, and as a practice is a normative fact. No country enjoys an absolute form of democracy; rather every country does enjoy a normative form of democracy. The degree may differ from country to country. So, democracy exists according to the nature of relationship between a society and its state. The same is true with Myanmar. The nature of regime in Myanmar is not totally authoritarian, as Western media trying to project it as a ‘totalitarian Myanmar.’ In this regard, a record shows that military in Myanmar came to power because of its corporate interest and unity, as well as, the individual security of its military commanders. There was no political structure that could produce a civilian regime acceptable to tatmadaw (the armed forces of the country). The NLD (National League for Democracy) was not an acceptable political party, as it would not accommodate various interests of the society as well as that of the tatmadaw. On the other hand, instead of finding a mutual ground, the NLD had been pursuing confrontational policies against tatmadaw. Besides, the political parties themselves have been weak in understanding well the political psychology of tatmadaw. Historical facts reveal that tatmadaw has favored democratic elements within the system, but apparently political parties misread and overlooked the message that the military government had persistently and consistently sent. While the military gave more attention to the “systematic” and “in accordance with law” aspects of power transfer, the NLD failed to follow the process systematically as expected by the military government. Moreover, at the outset of the 1990 elections even some regional commanders prepared systematic transfer of authority to an elected government, but what failed them in pursuing such a policy was because of the situation which was not conductive for a smooth political transition in Myanmar, leading SLORC to change its position on the constitution drafting process from a bystander to a key player. ¹⁰ Even today the sociological dimension of internal politics in Myanmar is that though the military regime, the State Peace and Development Council, may not have the full acceptance and support of the people of Myanmar, popular attitude believes in the credibility of tatmadawa as a stable instrumentality of governance and that in many ways the military regime is considered a beneficial institution. ¹¹                                       

In any case, to what extent these analyses are sincere and reliable or to what extent the people of Myanmar accept the legitimacy or authority of the junta is a different issue. What is important is the fact that reports on present political scenario in Myanmar (against the junta) which are being broadcasted by non-state actors such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, etc, as a matter of fact, has become a great concern for the regime in Myanmar, since such reports are made available to the international community and human rights organizations, presenting a worldwide impression about the ‘establishment’ in Myanmar as one of the world's most repressive and abusive regimes.

Such developments certainly do not serve the interest of the regime itself in Myanmar. Given the fact that today security and sovereignty of many developing countries largely can be determined by the most powerful states of the world such as United States of America and European Union, Myanmar needs to be more careful and flexible in both its domestic as well as foreign policy. The strategy of great powers is to transform the nature of those regimes, which do not comply with the international rules and regulations, as are dictated by the world’s super powers. These states often can be regarded as rogue states. ¹² Although Myanmar has not been included in this list, as far as the definition of the term is concerned it can be referred as a form of rogue state.  Thus, Myanmar’s internal security largely depends on its neighbors, as well as, on the role of Western powers such as EU and US. The effects of such threats are evident in the country throughout its history, but these effects, due to the remarkable developments in worldwide information systems and technological advancement have grown more and more intense, undermining the creditability of the regime in Myanmar. As a result of various developments including the reports against the junta on its human rights abuses on ethnic minorities like Karenni and Kachin states, in February 2008 the US tightened its financial sanctions on Myanmar and frizzed the assets of regime’s leaders linked to arms dealers and drug traders.¹³ The intervention is increasing, perhaps pushing the regime in Myanmar towards its downfall. The intervention was repeated once again in (21 May) 2009 when Myanmar’s government put the trial of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi back behind the closed doors, after allowing diplomats and journalists to attend the hearing for just one day. Immediately the following day, Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State warned the government of Myanmar by saying that the scheduled election of 2010 would be illegible because of the regime’s disrespect for democracy ¹⁴, while referring to the trial of Aung San Suu Kyi. Clinton further added, “We oppose the regime's efforts to use this incident as a pretext to place further unjustified restrictions on Aung San Suu Kyi. We call on the Burmese authorities to release her immediately and unconditionally, along with other more than 2,100 political prisoners currently being held. Clinton also asserted that she was raising the issue of Suu Kyi's arrest with Malaysia and the other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Countries and that the United States also will raise the issue with countries like China.” ¹⁵ Thus, internal developments in Myanmar have become global ones, making the regime obey international standards.

As a matter of fact, the scheduled election of 2010 has been another major source of tension in Myanmar, which not only faces with external threats such as those of US cited above, rather faces with some internal threats. In February 2008 the regime announced that a national election would be held in 2010, which this led the society into two major factions. In this respect, a number of groups including the 88 Generation Students Group and the Alliance of All Burma Buddhist Monks announced their intention to boycott the election. On the other hand, other groups including 125 politicians such as the former members of the Shan Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SNPLO) had formed a political party to contest the 2010 elections. Although some analysts believe that ahead of the election, the junta was offering financial inducements to encourage some groups including the United Wa State Army (UWSA) to disarm and contest the election, some others believe there are divisions within these groups, referring to the UWSA itself, which making preparation to confront the junta militarily. ¹⁶ Such and such incidents between the opposition groups and the junta in Myanmar would carry a message in which ‘elements of flexibility does exist in the nature of regime in Myanmar, as junta inviting some parties for negotiation over the issue of 2010 election.’ These political upheavals, however, if failed to reach an agreement by the year of 2010 probably may lead to another large anti-government demonstration in Myanmar like those of 1988 and 2007, which prompted a violent response by the government.

So far as the present scenario indicates, it seems that Myanmar is left only with one option and that is to deal with these situations peacefully and diplomatically particularly when international organizations such as United Nations or other countries such as Western powers keeping eye over the developments in the country while supporting the people of Myanmar. United Nations’ secretary general Ban Ki Moon in May 2008 visited Myanmar and expressed his support for the people and asked officials to move the country towards democracy. Again in early 2009 Ban Ki Moon urged the military regime of Myanmar to respect human rights and release all political detainees. ¹⁷ But, no positive developments have taken place so far. Foreign powers frequently criticizing Myanmar on the question of its human rights abuse. According to a report of 25 February 2009, on its annual report of human rights, the US State Department says government soldiers in Chin, Shan, Kachin, and Karen states continue to rape ethnic women and girls. ¹⁸ The same record, reports that the UN High Commission for Refugees has estimated that in present time around 150,000 refugees from Myanmar are living in camps along the border with Thailand with poor living conditions.

Anyway, as far as the case of India is concerned, these developments in Myanmar, as a neighbor to India, which has a highly strategic importance for this country, certainly will have some implications to India. The present political scenario in Myanmar, as well as, the unfavorable policies of EU and US such as economic sanctions on Myanmar definitely has a number of strategic implications to India. But, before concentrating on the issue, it is advisable to have a glimpse at the political relations between India and Myanmar. A background of Indo-Myanmar’s relations indicates that these two states throughout the years have been undergoing ups and downs in their diplomatic relations towards each other.

The military rule in Myanmar in 1962 did not sit well with India’s commitment to democracy and therefore political contacts between the two states became minimal and India since then has been weak in regaining a stable relation with Myanmar, leaving the vacuum for China to move into. Except recently i.e. in 2009 which India seems to remain passive towards the present scenario in Myanmar on the trial of Suu Kyi, for many years India has been criticizing the repression of human rights in Myanmar and exhorted its military rulers to respect the democratic sentiments of the people. So, there has been considerable tension between the two countries. As a result of this, it has been alleged that the SLORC has identified India as an enemy, which could invade Myanmar in the manner of India's involvement in Sri Lanka at that time. Although from 1992 the Indian government changed its approach and began a phase of cautious engagement with the SLORC such as several high ranking visits by Indian Foreign Secretary, Commerce Minister, the Chief of the Indian Army, and so on, and a certain amount of bilateral co-operation to address insurgencies and drug trade at the border, these could not guarantee a stable diplomatic tie between the two states. Therefore, despite the fact that Myanmar and India have close geographical contiguity as well as close cultural backgrounds, these two states remained distinct from each other throughout much of their history. The ideological factor did not allow India to maintain its political ties with Myanmar. The issue of idealistic and moral dilemmas of dealing with a military regime, which did not allow a democratically elected political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, had inhibited India from reviving normal relations with Myanmar in the late 1980s and early 1990s”, ¹⁹ can be taken as a prime example. Although these inhabitations have been set aside gradually, it clearly shows at least for one decade or so India has been diverted from keeping up its effective relations with Myanmar. It was only in 2004 that India changed track and welcomed military strongman Gen Than Shwe. ²⁰ The major reason behind this change of policy on the part of India was because of China’s growing presence in Myanmar. The extent of Chinese involvement in Myanmar has awakened India, pushing her to adopt a more realistic approach. Chinese have become more successful in developing ties with the military regime in Myanmar. The radar monitoring facility that China has developed on the Cocos Island, just north of India’s Andaman archipelago, enables the Chinese to track Indian naval movements in the region. ²¹ The energy investment also seem likely to fuel closer relations between China and Myanmar both in terms of potential natural gas supplies and the prospect of an oil pipeline across Myanmar to China. Today, perhaps more than other times in the history, the idea of Myanmar’s strategic importance for India has become very significant for India, making her not to repeat its old policy of supporting democratic process against the junta in Myanmar. For example, India has not reacted on the recent show trial of Suu Kyi held in late May 2009, in the manner it did before. On Suu Kyi’s issue, the very approach which is adopted by US, if had been taken by India could have worsened again the bilateral relations between India and Myanmar, making for both a ‘diversion’ from their mutual interest such as combating separatist groups, etc. Historical records indicate that for many years since Myanmar’s military take over in 1962, India has had opposed the regime in Myanmar in a number of manners and that only recently there have been some improvements in their relations. Thus, as long as the trial of Suu Kyi is concerned, apparently India prefers to have a subjective approach. This can benefit India in wining the side of junta in Myanmar, which in turn, for junta, can fade away the old concept of ‘an interventionist India.’ Such an approach can pave a way an opportunity for India to regain its sincere ties with Myanmar. As a matter of fact, ensuring that Myanmar does not become part of an exclusive area of influence of other great powers has been an objective of India’s foreign policy. This particular objective can be achieved only by, first normalizing relations with whatever government, which is in control of Myanmar, and then by expanding the range and content of bilateral relations.

The next major implication to India, which can overshadow its economic and military strategy, is the active presence of insurgency along the Indo-Myanmar border, which has become a matter of great concern. Since both countries share a land border with each other, many of the insurgent groups are based along the Indo-Myanmar border. These border-based insurgents fight against their respective central governments. Insurgents from India’s northeast are taking shelter in Myanmar and there have been an intensification of attacks on Indian targets. A record of January 2009 shows that from 1994 to 2009 over 16000 individuals have been killed in Northeast India, resulted from armed clashes and insurgency.²²    

For decades the Northeast of India has been going through political instability and ethnic insurgency. Since the independence of India in 1947 and Myanmar in 1948, many of these ethnic minorities have been struggling against their respective central governments so as to gain autonomy and for some even independence. Most of them have organized themselves in various violent separatist outfits and have often found across borders sympathy, shelter and finance. The Naga rebellion has been one of the most violent insurgencies in the region for the last fifty years, claiming the creation of a Greater Nagaland. The region more or less has been witnessing a rise of violence through ethnic and criminal clashes and drugs and weapons trafficking. Myanmar has long offered a harbor to many of them, seeking shelter beyond the Indo-Myanmar border. ²³ According to a 2008 report, at a two-day Foreign Office consultation between India and Myanmar, both stressed the need for greater vigilance at the border and agreed to enhance security cooperation to combat insurgent groups and arms smuggling. The talks covered a broad spectrum of bilateral issues, including security and border issues, trade and economic cooperation and cooperation in cross-border developmental projects, information technology, energy, power, education and training. The report says that the decisions taken at a joint trade committee held in October 2008 included converting India-Myanmar border trade into normal trade, opening of a border trade point at Avakhung in Nagaland, and expanding the existing border trade items from 22 to 40. ²⁴ Reportedly, the volume of trade between India and Myanmar touched $995 million in 2007-2008 and that India is Myanmar’s fourth-largest trading partner and its second biggest export market. ²⁵ However, although India and Myanmar’s economic ties have been growing over the past decade and the recent visit of India’s Vice- President Hamid Ansari in 2009 to Myanmar indicating growing economic potential, particularly in the areas of energy sector cooperation and infrastructure, ²⁶ the problem of insurgency must not be underestimated by India.  This problem, if not solved, can prevent India and Myanmar from developing their bilateral relations. In a 2009 four-day visit to Myanmar by M. M. Pallam Raju (Minister of State for Defense), the Minister said, “the military junta of Myanmar had been asked to cooperate on combating insurgents. It is strategically important in terms of trading potential that exists with Myanmar and also our own security implications. Because lot of insurgent groups operating in the northeast have their bases on the Indo-Myanmar border and they keep coming in, causing havoc. We are getting the government of Myanmar to cooperate on these issues. New Delhi had been giving arms and ammunitions to Myanmar to fight insurgents despite the fact that both the nations were not having any formal defense tie-ups between them. We have to strengthen economic ties that we share with Myanmar.”²⁷ Reportedly, there are 3,000 rebels, live and are being trained in the camps inside the jungles of Kabaw Valley of Myanmar's Sagaing Division. India has a pact with Myanmar to share intelligence, but officials say it is not enough to stop the insurgency. ²⁸ 

Myanmar’s cooperation is critical for maintaining peace and security in India’s Northeast Region, since many insurgent groups operating here seek sanctuary in Myanmar. Myanmar can be of help in the development of the Northeast Region, particularly since Bangladesh has been uncooperative on transit matters. Of late, as India’s ‘Look East’ policy has gathered momentum, Myanmar has assumed additional importance as the unavoidable geographical link for greater overland connectivity between India and ASEAN. Myanmar is India’s only neighbor that has a surplus trade balance with India, principally because of the large quantities of agricultural produce and pulses that it exports to India. India has also invested in major infrastructure projects in Myanmar, including in the transportation and energy sectors, which it needs to protect. ²⁹ Myanmar can provide a great deal of power to India’s Northeast regions. Access to Myanmar’s oil and gas reserves is probably the most important consideration in Indo-Myanmar relations. It will become increasingly important to ensure the security of Straits of Malacca hydroelectric projects with Myanmar such as Chindwin River project. ³⁰ Participating in road building activity in Myanmar significantly can reduce much of India’s concerns. For example, it can open a new linkage to Southeast Asia; it can potentially boost trade and tourism, which is crucial for the development of India’s Northeast, this region has somehow been left out of the national mainstream in terms of development; good road network on borders with Myanmar can reduce the response time in dealing with insurgents. It can also help deal with problems of law and order. After all, roads are an important factor in view of Myanmar’s strategic location between India and China. ³¹ 

Therefore, for India, there is a need to set up economic structures in the northeast; this connects it with the western part of Myanmar, as well as, to the Southeast Asia. But, in order to continue its economic developments such as road and rail link projects through Myanmar, first India has to solve the problem of insurgency. Because, many of the transportation links in the region, are controlled by the ethnic groups or militants, who demand either autonomy or separation. Consequently, these groups can disrupt any peaceful development. Although there have been joint military cooperation in this regard, it has not been very successful. Both governments need to develop a diplomatic approach or go for negotiation with these ethnic groups so that be able to tackle down the differences peacefully, before they work on transportation and economic projects.

So far as the issue of regional organizations is concerned, although the presence of different regional organizations did not help Myanmar and India to solve problems such as drug trafficking and insurgency, these organizations for such purposes can play an effective role. In order to extent their political, as well as, economic relations, both India and Myanmar can further the interest of each other in the effective materialization of the regional groupings such as the MGC, BIMSTECH, and ASEAN. In order to strengthen a peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations, via these organizations the two states along with other members can accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership. With the support of these regional organizations, they can combat terrorism and insurgency, as well as, can maintain a close cooperation with other international and regional organizations, which share similar aims and objectives.  Indo-Myanmar‘s economic objectives can be also promoted through other organizations such as BIMSTEC, which has broken the artificial boundaries of South and Southeast Asia. It brings together five states of South Asia --- Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and two states of Southeast Asia --- Myanmar and Thailand. With the object of promoting tourism, culture and education, India and Myanmar can work through Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) that brings together six ASEAN members --- India, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam.  For example, so far as the human resource development is concerned, productivity has not received adequate attention in Myanmar. India could collaborate with Singapore, where productivity movement is strong, in setting up HRD centers in Myanmar and equipping it with productivity tools and techniques especially in the areas of IT training, English language training and application of science and technology. ³²  

Finally, the third major strategic implication to India is the growing influence of China in Myanmar. Should Myanmar get irreversibly locked in China’s tight economic and strategic embrace, would pose serious security dangers to India. By establishing a substantial presence in the west of the Ayeyarwaddy (Irrawady) River and on the Rakhine (Arakan) coast, China has considerably neutralized India’s strategic preponderance in the Bay of Bengal. In North Myanmar, China has de facto control over Myanmar’s Kachin state bordering India’s state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as its territory. Unless a policy is put in place urgently to counter these Chinese moves, China can over time bring Arunachal Pradesh into its economic orbit and militarily outflank India in Arunachal Pradesh. Growing Chinese influence in the regions of Myanmar that border India would enable China to spread its influence and resume its support to insurgent groups in the northeast region. China has already established a foothold in Chittagong in Bangladesh.  A China sponsored link-up between Myanmar and Bangladesh would bring China right on India’s doorstep and complete China’s encirclement of India from the east. ³³

Although there is a growing concern within Myanmar itself about China’s increasing influence, and though Myanmar wants to develop a closer relationship with India (a viable alternative to balance China’s steadily increasing encroachments especially in the Kachin and Shan states), today it seems that between India and China, Myanmar may choose China. It is because China’s diplomatic flexibility can neutralize such a tactic by re-ensuring Myanmar of its support both in domestic, as well as, in international domains. For example, despite the fact that India recently has ignored pressure from Western powers to speak out and take action against Myanmar, the A-1 and A-3 blocks of gas off the coast of Myanmar were awarded to China. The concession went to China, because in January 2007, China exercised the almighty scepter of international relations, its Security Council veto, against a joint United States and United Kingdom resolution to condemn the human rights violations in Myanmar. ³⁴

It goes without saying that Myanmar’s importance to India cannot be overlooked. A hostile power-controlling base in Myanmar can seriously threaten Indian security as the Japanese did in 1942. Myanmar controls important land routes between China and the Andaman Sea in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, as mentioned earlier India is facing with insurgency from ethnic groups in its northeastern region adjacent to Myanmar. An unfriendly or weak government in Myanmar can wittingly or unwittingly help to strengthen the insurgency by allowing material support and sanctuaries on Myanmar soil, ³⁵ where shares a long border with the four states of India --- Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram.

Unfortunately, compared with China, so far, India relatively has been weaker in taking the side of Myanmar in international politics, for example, vis-à-vis EU and US sanctions at the UN Security Council, as happened in January 2007 (referred above) China exercised its veto against United States and United Kingdom resolution to condemn the human rights violations in Myanmar. India has to keep up such an approach in her foreign policy towards Myanmar, otherwise powers like China, which is already ahead of India can undermine the foreign policy of India towards Myanmar. It should not be missed that although the leaders of Myanmar are suspicious of Chinese influence over their country, they are primarily concerned with the survival of their regime. In this case, India does not have that much international influence that China has to stifle claims for regime change. Therefore, it seems that so long as the junta is in power it will be difficult for India to be able to provide Myanmar with security guarantees that China can give. As a result, it is unlikely that in a competition over resources or political influence between India and China, Myanmar would choose India. ³⁶ In this situation, India must adopt a better strategy towards Myanmar. For example, it can be a facilitator of ending Western misinterpretation of Myanmar and assist in the Latter’s re-incorporation in the global political mainstream. Obviously one of the main concerns for India is to counter China effectively by structuring a well-defined National Security Policy in consonance with its long-term national interest. But, this requires a tremendous political vision.

Notes & References

(1) The name “Burma” has been in use in English since the time of British colonial rule. In 1989, the military government officially changed the name of the country, to "Myanmar," but various world entities have chosen to accept or reject the name change. The United Nations, of which Burma is a member, endorsed the name change five days after its announcement by the junta. However, governments of many countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, France, and Canada still refer to the country as "Burma." Others, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the governments of Germany, Japan, China and Russia, recognise "Myanmar" as the official name. Media usage is also mixed. In spite of the usage by the US government, some American news outlets including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The International Herald Tribune and CNN, as well as, international news agencies such as the Associated Press, Reuters and Agence France-Presse have adopted the name "Myanmar". The name "Burma" is still widely used by other news outlets, including Voice of America, The Washington Post, The BBC, ITN, The Times, The Times of India and Time. Other sources often use combined terms such as "Burma, also known as Myanmar." In this paper, instead of “Burma” the name “Myanmar” is used.

(2) The Asian Age, Sundararaman  Shankari, “India must talk rights, not real-politik, with Burma,” (26 May 2009), p.11.

(3) The Asian Age, “Obama: Release Suu Kyi,” (Mumbai, 28 May 2009), p. 7.

(4) The Asian Age, Sundararaman  Shankari, “Inida must talk rights, not real-politik, with Burma,” (26 May 2009), p.11.

(5) Ibid.

(6) The Asian Age, Sundararaman  Shankari, “India must talk rights, not real-politik, with Burma,” (26 May 2009), p.11.  

(7) Conflict Data Base, “Myanmar in 2009: human rights,” the International Institute for Strategic Studies, acd.iiss.org

(8) For more, see, the various reports on armed clashes, insurgency, and population displacement in “Myanmar 2009” on acd.iiss.org, the Conflict Data Base, (the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009).

(9) Ibid., 25 March 2009.

(10) For more on politics in Myanmar, see Maung Aunf Myoe, A Historical Overview of Political Transition in Myanmar Since 1988, (Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, working Paper Series No. 95, August 2007), pp. 5-30.

(11) Online News India Mart, Dixit J.N, “Strategic Importance of Myanmar for India: Jaswant Singh’s visit,” (26 March 2001), p.2.

(12) Rogue state is a term applied by some international theorists to states considered threatening to the world's peace. This means meeting certain criteria, such as being ruled by authoritarian regimes that severely restrict human rights, sponsor terrorism, and seek to proliferate weapons of mass destruction. The term is used most by the United States, though it has been applied by other countries. In this list, countries such as Iran, Iraq under Sadam Hossain, Seria, and North Korea have been included, however, Myanmar has not been included in the list.

(13) For more on the recent political developments in Myanmar, see, acd.iiss.org “Myanmar in 2008 & 2009,” Armed Conflict Data Base, the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

(14) Times of India, Pune, (22 May 2009), p. 15.

(15) CNN, “Myanmar democracy leader facing trial after American's swim”, (May 17, 2009), edition.cnn.com

(16) Conflict Data Base, “Myanmar in 2008,” the International Institute for Strategic Studies, acd.iiss.org

(17) Voice of America, Margaret Besheer, “UN chief urges Burma to release all political prisoners,” (23 Feb 2009), voanews.com

(18) Conflict Data Base, “Myanmar in 2009: human rights,” the International Institute for Strategic Studies, acd.iiss.org

(19) Online News India Mart, Dixit J.N, “Strategic Importance of Myanmar for India: Jaswant Singh’s visit,” (March 26, 2001), p. 1.  

(20) For more on the issue, see, Hindustan Times, Hossain Syed Zarir, “exiled Myanmar Leaders shocked by India’s Stance”, Indo-Asian News Service, (29/09/2007).

(21) Sumit Ganguly, “India and China: Border Issues, Domestic Integration & International Security”, Francine R. Frankel (editor), The India-China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement, (Oxford University Press, 2004), p.123.

(22) The Times of India, Pune, (05 January 2009), p. 7.

(23) India International Center, New Delhi, Conference Room 1, Egreteau Renaud, “India & Burma/Myanmar Relations: From Idealism to Realism,” (11 Sept, 2003), p. 8.

(24) News Track India, “India, Myanmar to expand security cooperation”, (National, 24 Nov 2008), newstrackindia.com

(25) The Asian Age, Sundararaman  Shankari, “Inida must talk rights, not real-politik, with Burma,” (26 May 2009), p.11.

(26) Ibid.

(27) News Track India, “India wants Myanmar to act on insurgency on border,” (Mandalay, Sun, 08 Feb 2009), newstrackindia.com

(28) Ibid., the report is given by Ravi Shankar.

(29) Sikri Rajive, Challenge & Strategy: rethinking India’s foreign policy, (SAGE publication, New Delhi, 2009), pp. 65-66.

(30) Udai Bhanu Singh, “India’s Policy in Southeast Asia,” V.D. Chopra (editor), India’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, (Kal paz Publications, Delhi-2006), p. 288.

(31) The Hindu, Amit Baruah, “we will help combat insurgency: Myanmar,” (Feb 17, 2001).

(32) Udai Bhanu Singh, “India’s Policy in Southeast Asia,” V.D. Chopra (editor), India’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, (Kal paz Publications, Delhi-2006), p. 288.

(33) Sikri Rajive, Challenge & Strategy: rethinking India’s foreign policy, (SAGE publication, New Delhi, 2009), pp. 65-66.

(34) Ann Koppuzha, “India’s Myanmar Policy An Alternative Roadmap, morungexpress.com

(35) Dalijit Singh, “Cooperative Security Measures: India & Southeast Asia”, V.R.Raghavan & Karl Fisher (editors), Security Dimensions of India & Southeast Asia, (Tata Mc Graw-Itill-2005), p.81.

(36) Ann Koppuzha, “India’s Myanmar Policy An Alternative Roadmap,  Ann Koppuzha, “India’s Myanmar Policy An Alternative Roadmap, morungexpress.com

Ahmad Reza Taheri, YC- National Center of International Security & Defense Analysis, University of Pune